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Protecting Surface Land by Internalizing the
Cost of Oil and Gas Development:
Wyoming's Surface Owner Accommodation
Act Strikes a More Sustainable Balance
by JENNIFER A. C. RICHARDSON*
Introduction
Technical advancements in drilling that allow access to
previously unconventional mining areas, plus recent federal drilling
efforts to develop more domestic oil and gas have led to predictions
that the total number of wells in Wyoming will double within the next
ten years.' While mineral development accelerates, the value of
surface land for open space, clean air, and remote locations is also
increasing as Wyoming's population expands.2 Considering that
almost half of all privately owned land in Wyoming is located on top
of federal minerals,' the stage is set for amplified conflicts over the
regulation of surface damage cause by mineral development. These
disputes can be heated and Wyoming has a history of such conflicts.
In one case, a surface owner barred entry by the federal mineral
lessee until the developer agreed to pay annual damages, which he
refused to do.4 When the lessee entered anyway with heavy drilling
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.,
cum laude, 2006, University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Professor
John Leshy for his guidance and for introducing me to property, public land, and natural
resources law. I would also like to thank my family, Neil, Kathryn, and Scott Richardson,
for their constant support; and Andrew Alire for his encouragement.
1. Oil and Gas Drilling on Split Estate Lands, LANDOWNERS ASS'N OF WYO.,
http://www.wyominglandowners.org/splitestates/index.php (last visited April 10, 2010)
[hereinafter LANDOWNERS ASS'N].
2. Id.; see also Jan G. Laitos & Elizabeth H. Getches, Multi-Layered, and Sequential,
State and Local Barriers to Extractive Resource Development, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8
(2004).
3. LANDOWNERS ASS'N, supra note 1.
4. Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co., 638 P.2d 147, 149-50 (Wyo. 1981).
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equipment in tow, the surface owner warned that if any of the
equipment moved off the road, he would shoot out every tire.'
Beyond the legal rights that attach to property ownership, the
actual effects of oil and gas development on surface land are
significant. Once development begins, it decreases the surface
owner's quality of life by creating noise, dust, and traffic.' Loss of
privacy is another big issue, as it is not just oil and gas personnel that
monitor the site-development includes consultation with
archaeologists, wildlife biologists, and plant specialists.! The footprint
of development is not limited to the drilling plot either. Wastewater
discharges affect downstream areas, damaging both soil and
vegetation' and mining impacts the surface environment through
increased erosion, water quality issues, spread of noxious weeks, and
disturbance to wildlife habitats.9 The effects of mineral development
can also cause surface owners to abandon future plans for the surface
such as using the property for hunting or as a rustic retreat.o
Additionally, so long as the mineral developer is not negligent,
excessive, or unreasonable in his use of the surface, he does not have
a duty to restore the land to its original condition." A Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM") Report summarized the situation best:
as the federal law currently stands, surface owners "bear the brunt of
the development, have their lives and land changed forever, and
receive little if any compensation."12
At the state level, some legislatures have reexamined whether
the cost of surface damage is best borne by the surface owner, or
instead by the developers and consumers of the minerals." The
5. Id. at 150.
6. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 - SECTION 1835 SPLIT ESTATE, FEDERAL
OIL AND GAS LEASING AND DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES, A REPORT TO CONGRESS 10





11. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894, 897 (N.M. 1985); see also
Exxon Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W. 3d 22, 30 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that lessee had no
express duty to restore the surface and that no such duty was implied).
12. BLM REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 9.
13. See Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 n.4 (N.D. 1979); see also
Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 556 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984). Other states with
Surface Damage Protection Acts include Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia.
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Wyoming Legislature did just that with the 2005 Wyoming Surface
Owner Accommodation Act ("WSOAA"), which provides surface
owners with protections supplementary to those provided under
federal law, such as requiring notice before entry and the
commencement of operations, negotiation regarding the planning of
oil and gas activities, and fair compensation for economic losses
caused by development.14 But, the applicability of this state law to
federally leased minerals has yet to be officially determined as no
suits challenging the WSOAA have been decided. When the
WSOAA first passed, the Director of BLM asserted that it conflicts
with federal law and thus cannot be applied to federal minerals." In
contrast, the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
("WOGCC"), Wyoming Governor Dave Freudenthal, and
Wyoming's Attorney General Pat Crank maintained that the
WSOAA is indeed applicable to federal minerals in split estates.
This paper explores the several ways in which the WSOAA
protects surface owners and concludes that the Act does so without
conflicting with federal laws or the ultimate objectives of federal
mineral leasing-therefore, preemption is not authorized by the
Supremacy Clause.
I. Background
By 1900, split estates were well established on private land in the
United States, with the surface owner and mineral owner each
holding indefeasible title and all the "incidents of separate
ownership."" These split estates began with coal and hard rock
mining, but soon reached oil and gas estates as well." Between 1909
and 1916, Congress passed a series of laws requiring that all federal
land patents granted to private citizens must reserve the mineral
14. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§30-5-401 to -410 (2009).
15. Matt Micheli, Showdown at the OK Corral - Wyoming's Challenge to U.S.
Supremacy on Federal Split Estate Lands, 6 WYO. L. REV. 31, 34 (2006) (citing letter from
Kathleen Clarke, Dir., United States Bureau of Land Management, to Don J. Likwartz,
State Oil & Gas Supervisor, Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n (June 13, 2005) (on
file with the Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n)).
16. Micheli, supra note 15, at 34.
17. Smith v. Jones, 60 P. 1104, 1106 (Utah 1900); see also Andrew C. Mergen, Surface
Tension: The Problem of Federal/Private Split Estate Lands, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV.
419, 425 (1998).
18. Mergen, supra note 17, at 425.
rights to the United States." The most important of these laws was
the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 ("SRHA"),0 under which
the majority of Wyoming homesteads were granted.2 1 Nationwide,
over 32 million acres were patented under the SRHA before
President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an Executive Order in 1935
that withdrew all of the unappropriated and unreserved public lands
in twelve Western states from settlement, location, or entry-
effectively ending the homesteading era.22
The specifics of the SRHA are important because in managing
split estates, BLM "must comply with the provisions of the Act under
which the surface was patented."23 The SRHA opened tracts of 640
acres or less for settlement and reserved all minerals and the right to
mine them to the United States.24 Any person who thereafter
acquires from the United States the right to mine and remove coal or
other mineral deposits25 is permitted to enter and occupy as much of
the surface land as may be necessary for "all purposes reasonably
incident" to the removal of the minerals.26 In terms of compensation
to the surface owner for this incursion, the mineral developer is
required to pay for damages to "crops," "improvements," 27 and the
"value of the land for grazing."' Reimbursement for other damages
is only required if it is caused by the excessive or negligent use of the
surface.2 9 So long as the use of the surface is limited to use reasonably
19. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND
THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 51-52 (1992); see also Mergen, supra note 17, at 426.
20. 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-298, 300, 302 (repealed 1976); 43 U.S.C. §§ 299, 301 (2006).
21. LANDOWNERS ASS'N, supra note 1.
22. Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 514-15 (1980).
23. BLM REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 6.
24. 43 U.S.C. § 291 (repealed 1976).
25. "Other minerals" includes oil and gas. Skeen v. Lynch, 48 F.2d 1044 (10th Cir.
1931).
26. 43 U.S.C. § 299(a) (2006).
27. Id.
28. 30 U.S.C. § 54 (2006); 43 C.F.R. § 3814.1(b) (2009); see Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v.
Kieffer, 1 F.2d 795, 797 (D. Wyo. 1924) (affd Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S.
488 (1928) (superseded by statute as stated in Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Wyoming, 766
P.2d 537, 544 (Wyo. 1988))) ("'crops' clearly refers to agriculture, and the term
'improvements,' . . . can reasonably have no other significance than those of an agricultural
nature").
29. Bell v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 85 N.W.2d 246, 250 (N.D. 1957); see also Mergen,
supra note 17, at 433.
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necessary to extract the leased minerals,o courts have historically
placed few restrictions on mineral developers and have refrained
from balancing any interests of the surface owner.
But recent state initiated surface damage acts, as well as the
evolution of the accommodation doctrine, "illustrate a trend [in]
providing greater protection to the surface owner than common law
recognizes."3 The 1971 Texas case of Getty Oil v. Jones33 was the first
to place limitations on the mineral estate's use of the surface in
holding that "the mineral estate owner's right to use the surface [is]
not absolute. "3 The Getty Oil accommodation doctrine did not go so
far as to become a balancing test, but it does require that mineral
developers act prudently and "have due regard for the interests of the
surface owner in exercising [the] right to use the surface to explore
for and extract minerals."" If the surface owner seeks
accommodation of his uses, the burden is on him to demonstrate that
the "developer's surface use is unreasonable and that reasonable
alternatives exist."" The rationale behind this doctrine is that when
alternative access is reasonable, it should be used because "each
[owner] should have the right to the use and enjoyment of his interest
in the property to the highest degree possible not inconsistent with
the rights of the other."3 7
30. Belle Fourche, 766 P.2d at 544 (citing Harry A. Thompson, Surface Damages -
Claims by Surface Estate Owner Against Mineral Estate Owner, 14 WYO. L. J. 99 (1959-
60)).
31. Christopher M. Alspach, Surface Use by the Mineral Owner: How Much
Accommodation is Required Under Current Oil and Gas Law?, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 89, 91
(2002).
32. See generally, JOHN D. LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL
MOTION (1987); see also Mergen, supra note 17, at 433 (citing John F. Welborn, New
Rights of Surface Owners: Changes in the Dominant/Servient Relationship Between the
Mineral and Surface Estates, 40 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 22.01, 22-14 (1994)
(observing that there are increasingly legislative and political inroads on common law
notions of mineral estate dominance)).
33. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 627-28 (Tex. 1971).
34. Alspach, supra note 31, at 92 (emphasis added).
35. Mergen, supra note 17, at 433.
36. Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 627-28; see also Mergen, supra note 17, at 435.
37. Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976); see also Mergen,
supra note 17, at 435-36.
H. Preemption
The Supremacy Clause" invalidates state laws that interfere with
or are contrary to federal laws." The Property Clause grants the
power to Congress to "make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States."40  The Court has continually supported the view that
Congress is entrusted this power over public lands "without
limitations."4' But, the notion that this exempts federal lands from all
state regulation is "totally unfounded."42 The Supreme Court made it
clear in Kleppe v. New Mexico that states are free to enforce civil and
criminal laws on federal land just "so long as they do not conflict with
federal law."43 So state laws are permitted to have some power over
federal land, but not to the extent that they "alter or change an
interest in federal property"" or interfere with "'the full power in the
United States to protect its lands, to control their use and to prescribe
in what manner others may acquire rights to them."'4 5
There are three different routes to federal preemption of state
laws: express, implied, and operational. Congress has the power to
expressly preempt state law if it chooses to do so,46 but it has not done
so for mineral leasing via any of the governing statutes: the Mineral
Leasing Act ("MLA"),47 the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ("EPACT"),"
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"),49 or the
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, cl. 2.
39. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824).
40. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
41. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940); see also Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
42. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543.
43. Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580 (1987); see also
Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543.
44. Micheli, supra note 15, at 44.
45. Id. (quoting Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002)).
46. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
(citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
47, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 693 P.2d 227, 236 (Wyo.
1985) (finding that the MLA does not reflect "a pervasive regulatory scheme or an intent
to abolish state influence over mining activities on federal property"); see also Texas Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp. 366, 371 (W.D. Okla. 1967) (holding the
MLA contains no prohibition against the exercise of state police power).
48. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. BDS Int'l, LLC, 159 P.3d 773, 784 (Colo. App. 2006).
49. Id.
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SRHA." Therefore, the WSOAA's state regulations on mineral
leasing are not expressly preempted.
Implied preemption of an entire field occurs when the federal
interest in the field is "so dominant that the federal system is assumed
to preclude the enforcement of state laws on the same subject.""
Courts have repeatedly held that the MLA is not meant to assert
exclusive control over federally leased mineral lands.52 Rather,
Congress has always allowed local governments to play a significant
role in regulating the impacts of federal mineral development."
Because Congress does not exclusively control the regulation of
federal minerals located under federal surfaces, and BLM has stated
that private surfaces are offered "the same level of protection
provided [to] Federally owned surface,"- it follows that Congress
does not occupy the entire regulatory field of federal minerals located
under private surfaces.
For the WSOAA to be struck down on preemption grounds, it
must actually conflict with federal laws or stand as an obstacle to the
purposes of Congress. To determine whether state and federal
regulations actually conflict, they are compared on their face and
preemption occurs when "compliance with both... is a physical
impossibility"" or when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.",16 If either of these types of conflict occurs, then state law
is preempted to the extent it conflicts with federal law. A
preemption claim will only be successful if no set of conditions exists
where both laws can stand without conflict.
50. 43 U.S.C. § 299(a).
51. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Hillsborough
Cnty., 471 U.S. at 713.
52. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 406 F.2d 1303, 1304 (10th Cir.
1969); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 159 P.3d at 784 (discussing Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite
Rock, 480 U.S. 572 (1987)); Gulf Oil, 693 P.2d at 236.
53. Gulf Oil, 693 P.2d at 235.
54. BLM REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at A-1, A-4.
55. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); see also
Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S. at 713.
56. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S.
at 713.
57. Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 142-43.
58. Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580 (1987).
I. Federal Purposes in Mineral Leasing
Before analyzing whether the WSOAA is operationally
preempted, it is necessary to understand the several federal policies
that guide mineral leasing and the objectives of leasing federal
minerals.
A. Mineral Leasing Act
The purpose of the MLA is to promote the orderly development
of oil and gas deposits through the use of private enterprise." The
United States has broad discretion to offer federal minerals for lease,
as well as the power to control development through lease terms and
stipulations.' Leases for federal minerals are issued under the MLA,
regardless of whether the surface over the minerals is federal or
private. As a component of leasing, the Secretary of the Interior shall
"regulate all surface-disturbing activities conducted pursuant to any
lease issued under this chapter, and shall determine reclamation and
other actions as required in the interest of conservation of surface
resources." Since the plain language says this regulation applies to
"any lease issued under this Act," the Secretary should regulate
surface-disturbing activities that take place on private surfaces in to
the same extent it does for federal surfaces.
B. Federal Land Policy and Management Act
The passage of FLPMA in 1976 retained 'public lands' under
BLM jurisdiction62 and provided a broad mandate that applies to
mining operations and several other activities: "In managing the
public lands the Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any
action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the
lands."" Split estate lands are included in the term 'public lands,'"
59. Harvey v. Udall, 384 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1967); see also Geosearch, Inc. v.
Andrus, 508 F. Supp. 839, 842 (D. Wyo. 1980).
60. GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND
RESOURCES LAW 620 (6th ed. 2007).
61. 30 U.S.C. § 226(g) (2006).
62. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (2006) ("The term "public lands" means any land and interest
in land owned by the United States within the several States and administered by the
Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Management, without regard to how
the United States acquired ownership . . .").
63. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
64. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 335 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (The split estate in this
case was federal surface over private mineral. The conclusion that the federal estate
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therefore the federal mineral estate under private surface is managed
according to the dictates of FLPMA.
Private surfaces are not managed according to FLPMA. But,
BLM outlined in its EPACT report to Congress that one of BLM's
responsibilities is to "offer[] the private surface owner the same level
of protection provided on Federally owned surface[s]."" Therefore,
in regulating federal minerals, BLM has assumed the responsibility of
protecting private surface resources to the same degree it protects
federal surface resources.
Federal surfaces are managed and protected in part through the
Department of the Interior's development, maintenance, and revision
of land use plans.' BLM regulations call these written land use plans
Resource Management Plans ("RMP")" and they are prepared for
mineral leases even when the only federal interest involved is the
mineral estate." To properly manage federal lands, RMPs are
required to "consider present and potential uses of the public lands"
and "weigh long-term benefits to the public against short-term
benefits."69 In addition to the standard considerations, when the only
federal interest involved is the mineral estate, BLM regulations
specifically provide that RMPs must consider the impact of mineral
leasing on the "non-public land surface."o By taking private surface
impacts into account, BLM's objective is to "maximize resource
values for the public"" and manage land "in a manner
that ... provide[s] for ... human occupancy and use."72
C. Energy Policy Act of 2005
The EPACT was passed in 2005 to urgently develop "the
technological capabilities to support the broadest range of energy
policy options through conservation and use of domestic resources by
socially and environmentally acceptable means."7  The EPACT
portion of the split estate is 'public land' should still apply when the minerals are federal
and the surface private.).
65. BLM Report to Congress, supra note 6, at A-1, A-4.
66. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2006).
67. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(n) (2009).
68. Id. at § 1601.0-7(b).
69. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(5), (7) (2006).
70. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-8 (2009).
71. Id. at § 1601.0-2.
72. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (2006).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 5902(a) (2006).
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called for a streamlining of the environmental analyses necessary for
mineral development, but when the Act is examined in its entirety, it
calls for streamlining in a manner that addresses surface owner
concerns and minimizes impacts.74 To accomplish this, the EPACT
called for BLM to consult with private surface owners, the oil and gas
industry, and other interested parties to assess the effect of current
policies and practices." The Secretary was then required to report to
Congress on the results of this comparison of rights and
responsibilities and to make recommendations of administrative or
legislative actions that could be taken to continue to facilitate access
to minerals "while addressing surface owner concerns and minimizing
impacts to private surface."77
1. Impact on the National Environmental Policy Act and Changes After
Audit
In order to fast-track energy development, the EPACT
established five rebuttable presumptions to categorically exclude
certain oil and gas activities from analysis under the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")." Whenever a project meets
the conditions of any of the five sections, 79 BLM can use a section 390
categorical exclusion ("390CE") to bypass the preparation of new
NEPA documents.' Section 390 therefore appeared to shift BLM's
74. See infra Part III.C.ii.
75. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1835(a), 119 Stat. 594, 721.
76. Id. at § 1835(a)(1).
77. Id. at § 1835(a)(3).
78. COGGINS, supra note 60, at 674.
79. "(1) Individual surface disturbances of less than 5 acres so long as the total surface
disturbance on the lease is not greater than 150 acres and site-specific analysis in a
document prepared pursuant to NEPA has been previously completed. (2) Drilling an oil
or gas well at a location of well pad site at which drilling has occurred previously within 5
years prior to the date of spudding the well. (3) Drilling an oil or gas well within a
developed field for which an approved land use plan or any environmental document
prepared pursuant to NEPA analyzed such drilling as a reasonably foreseeable activity, so
long as such plan or document was approved within 5 years prior to the date of spudding
the well. (4) Placement of a pipeline in an approved right-of-way corridor, so long as the
corridor was approved within 5 years prior to the date of placement of the pipeline. (5)
Maintenance of a minor activity, other than any construction or major renovation or a
building or facility." NEPA Review, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 390(b), 119 Stat. 594, 721
(2005); codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15942 (2006).
80. U. S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-872, ENERGY POLICY ACT OF
2005: GREATER CLARITY NEEDED TO ADDRESS CONCERNS WITH CATEGORICAL
EXCLUSIONS FOR OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT UNDER SECTION 390 OF THE ACT, at 3,
9 (2009) [hereinafter GAO Report]. See also BLM H-1790-1 NATIONAL
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priorities to emphasize resource extraction "at the expense of certain
other agency missions, especially protecting its environmental
resources."8'
But after the 390CEs were put into use, concerns were raised
about BLM's use of the exclusions and the U.S. Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") audited the program. The resulting
GAO Report identified significant issues with the use of 390CEs such
as a lack of definitive and clear guidance from BLM, little oversight
of field offices, numerous violations of the law, and noncompliance
with existing guidance.2 The GAO Report recommended that
Congress consider amending section 390 to clarify and resolve the
identified issues.' Though it remains to be seen whether Congress
will take action to amend or clarify section 390, BLM has reformed
the EPACT-instituted procedures in order to better manage energy
resources and to complete detailed environmental reviews in line with
other federal requirements."
2. BLM's Comparison of Rights and Responsibilities
BLM's Report to Congress regarding the effect of current
policies found that surface owner's concerns revolved around mineral
development's disturbance of their quality of life due to the increase
in activity and the loss of land value-both economic and intangible."
BLM's recommendation for action, instead of shifting any rights or
responsibilities, focused on increased notification to surface owners
during the planning process for leasing-primarily through the media
and BLM's website."
By asking BLM to review current policies and make
recommendations for the future, it seems incredibly off the mark that
Congress expected the 'new' strategy to be essentially educating
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT HANDBOOK, (2008), (which requires staff to "document
their decisions and rationale for using any [390CE] to approve an oil or gas project.");
BLM INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM NO. 2005-247 (September 30,2005).
81. GAO Report, supra note 80, at 51.
82. Id. at 30, 50 (for instance, in eighty-five percent of sampled field offices, officials
did not correctly follow BLM guidance, the most common failure was inadequate
justification for the use of categorical exclusions).
83. Id. at 53.
84. Noelle Straub, Interior Curbs Oil and Gas Lease Streamlining, Expands Reviews,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/01/06/06greenwire-interior-
curbs-oil-and-gas-lease-streamlining-59957.html.
85. BLM Report to Congress, supra note 6, at 9.
86. Id. at 13-15.
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surface owners of existing policies and practices.' While this may
reduce conflicts as parties better understand what to expect in the
mineral leasing process, it does little to actually address surface owner
concerns or minimize any impacts to private surfaces.
IV. Operational Preemption Analysis
Wyoming has done what Congress appears to have expected
BLM to do: address surface owner concerns while continuing to allow
access to federal minerals. The remainder of this paper compares the
state and federal statutes and regulations, and determines that
because compliance with both laws is possible and the WSOAA does
not frustrate federal purposes, the regulations do not operationally
conflict.
Under the SRHA, the mineral developer may enter the surface
to conduct mining operations in three alternative ways. First, he may
enter upon securing written consent or waiver from the surface
owner." Second, he may enter upon the payment of an agreed-upon
amount for damages to "crops or other tangible improvements."89
And third, in lieu of the success of the first or second alternatives, he
may enter after posting a "good and sufficient bond" for the benefit
of the surface owner." All three of these options further the federal
purpose of mineral leasing: develop oil and gas deposits' while
minimizing impacts to the surface."
The WSOAA requirements echo those of the SRHA. Under the
WSOAA, the mineral developer must first comply with the provisions
of the Act and reasonably accommodate existing surface uses before
87. The BLM Report to Congress acknowledged that state surface owner protection
statutes provide more protection than federal laws; that where both state and federal
protections exist, surface owners prefer the state protections; and that split estate conflicts
have recently moved to the forefront in Western states. Though the report took a neutral
stance on preemption and did not address the applicability of these state laws to federal
minerals. It did note that if parties are concerned about inconsistencies between state and
federal laws, they could address the issue of damages in Surface Use Agreements. Id. at
25.
88. 43 U.S.C. § 299(a) (2006).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Harvey v. Udall, 384 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1967); see also Geosearch, Inc. v. Andrus,
508 F. Supp. 839 (D. Wyo. 1980).
92. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1835(a)(3), 119 Stat. 594, 721
(2005).
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entry is allowed." There are two ways to do this. First, the developer
can provide the required notice,94 attempt good faith negotiations,5
and obtain a valid consent, waiver, or surface use agreement that
provides for the compensation of damages. Or second, if parties
reach an impasse in negotiations, the mineral developer may still
access the mineral estate by executing a "good and sufficient surety
bond" to secure payment for damages.
A. Entry through Notice, Good Faith Negotiations, and Consent or
Waiver
Federal regulations fill in the details of the SRHA regarding
notice and good faith negotiations. Before actual mining operations
begin, the mineral developer may enter the surface estate to conduct
surveys or gather other needed information." No specific notice is
required for this entry, but the developer "should seek to reach
agreement with the surface owner about the time and method by
which any survey would be conducted."" To commence operations,
BLM guidance states the mineral operator must make a "good faith
effort to notify the private surface owner before entry and make a
good faith effort to obtain a Surface Access Agreement.'" The
developer must certify to BLM these efforts were made and that
either an agreement was reached or negotiations failed.o If
93. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402(a) (2009).
94. Prior to initial entry to conduct nonsurface disturbing activities, operator shall
provide at least five days of notice to surface owner. Id. at § 30-5-402(b) (any subsequent
entry for nonsurface disturbing purposes does not require notice). Notice shall
"sufficiently disclose the plan of work and operations to enable the surface owner to
evaluate the effect of oil and gas operations on the surface owner's use of the land." Id. at
§ 30-5-402(e).
95. Good faith negotiations should be used to attempt to reach a surface use
agreement for "the protection of the surface resources, reclamation activities, timely
completion of reclamation of the disturbed areas and payment for damages caused by the
oil and gas operations." Id. at § 30-5-402(f). Either party has the right to request, and
upon mutual agreement may use, dispute resolution processes. Id.
96. Id. at § 30-5-402(c)(i), (ii).
97. Id. at § 30-5-402(c)(iv).
98. Onshore Oil & Gas Order No. 1, 72 Fed. Reg. 10,328, 10,336 (Mar. 7, 2007) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3160) [hereinafter Onshore Oil & Gas Order].
99. Id.
100. Id. Any consent of waiver must come from the entryman or patentee. 43 C.F.R.
§ 3814.1(c) (2009); see also Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537, 543 (Wyo.
1988) (holder of an easement not protected).
101. Onshore Oil & Gas Order, supra note 98.
negotiations fail, entry may still be acquired by posting bond."0
Recognizing that states may have more detailed or different
regulations, general performance standards require that the mineral
developer's notice and plan of operations also be conducted "in a
manner that complies with all pertinent Federal and state laws."'03
The WSOAA requires notice be given to the surface owner
before initial entry and before operations commence. The first entry
of the surface requires notice of at least five days.'" For any
subsequent entries to conduct non-surface disturbing activities, the
WSOAA only says that the "operator shall provide notice."'o For the
actual commencement of mineral operations, notice of a work plan
must be given to the surface owner no more than 180 days before
development begins, but no less than 30 days.' Once this notice is
provided, the mineral developer must attempt good faith negotiations
with the surface owner for "the protection of the surface resources,
reclamation activities, timely completion of reclamation of the
disturbed areas and payment for damages caused by the oil and gas
operations."' 7 As with the SRHA, if negotiations fail, entry may still
be accomplished under another provision by posting sufficient
bond.'a
1. Compliance with Both as a Physical Impossibility
Comparing the two sets of regulations, the federal regulations
offer vague guidelines, whereas the WSOAA provides defined notice
periods. But, the state regulations do not require any action that
makes it impossible to also satisfy federal regulations. Nor do the
federal regulations require anything that makes it impossible for the
mineral developer to comply with the WSOAA. For instance, when
the developer provides a work plan to the surface owner as required
by the WSOAA and undertakes good faith negotiations to protect
surface resources and pay for damages, the federal good faith effort
to reach a Surface Access Agreement is also satisfied. The WSOAA
does not have different requirements for the plan of operations, but if
102. See infra Part IV.C.
103. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.420(a)(6) (2009).
104. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402(b) (2009).
105. Id. ("nonsurface" activities include "inspections, staking, surveys, measurements
and general evaluation of proposed routes and sites for oil and gas operations.").
106. Id. at § 30-5-402(d), (e).
107. Id. at § 30-5-402(f).
108. See infra Part IV.C.
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it did, the federal mineral developer would need to comply with both
as directed by federal regulations.'" Therefore, the WSOAA notice
and negotiation provision cannot be preempted on the ground that it
is physically impossible to comply with both state and federal
requirements.
2. Frustration of Federal Purposes
Regarding whether the more detailed WSOAA notice and
negotiation provisions frustrate congressional intent, the WSOAA
does not substitute state judgment for that of the federal government
in any way that prohibits mineral development. Requiring notice
before extraction is very different from requiring surface owner
consent to move forward." If the WSOAA instituted surface owner
protections so stringent that the surface owner or state could block
development-that would be an impermissible state veto on federal
action."' Should that be the situation, preemption would be clearly
authorized."2 But under the WSOAA, so long as notice is given to
the surface owner and negotiations are at least attempted in good
faith, the state cannot bar the developer from entry. It is important to
note that federal regulations also require both notice and good faith
negotiations, so this WSOAA provision does not require additional
steps. The requirements are just more explicit than in the federal
regulations. Not only is negotiating with the surface owner in line
with federal regulations, it also embodies the congressional purposes
in the EPACT to address surface owner concerns and minimize
surface impacts."3
Also, the WSOAA does not allow any of the required
negotiations to stop development of federal minerals and hence does
not frustrate federal leasing purposes. So long as the operator gives
notice and attempts negotiations, if reaching an agreement fails, the
posting of bond allows development to proceed, even if development
is against the surface owner's wishes.114 Because state requirements
do not frustrate the federal objective to lease and develop minerals,
109. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.420(a)(6) (2009).
110. See Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 556 n.5 (8th Cir. 1984).
111. See Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580 (1987).
112. Id.
113. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1835(a)(3), 119 Stat. 594,
1140 (2005).
114. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402(c)(iv) (2009); see also infra Part IV.C.
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Wyoming is able to enforce the WSOAA on private surfaces
overlaying federal mineral estates.'15
B. Entry Through Payment for Damages
Under the SRHA, if the mineral developer is unable to secure a
written consent or waiver from the surface owner, he may still enter
the surface by reaching an agreement on the amount of damages to
be payable for harm to crops, tangible improvements, and the value
of the land for grazing."'
Under the WSOAA, if entry and development proceed under
the option of notice, good faith negotiations, and a surface use
agreement, the agreement must provide for the compensation of
damages to the surface."' Damages compensable under the WSOAA
go beyond those authorized in the SRHA to include "loss of
production and income, loss of land value, and loss of value to
improvements caused by oil and gas operations.""" But, should a
mineral developer be unwilling to pay damages in surplus to those
covered by the SRHA, the WSOAA cannot stop development on this
basis. As discussed briefly and as will be discussed in more depth
shortly, entry can still be undertaken if the developer posts a bond."'
1. Compliance with Both as a Physical Impossibility
It is not impossible to satisfy both damage requirements because
paying for the SRHA mandated damages does not preclude the
ability of the developer to also compensate for the WSOAA
damages-a higher bond will just be needed. The more pertinent
issue in this conflict consideration is whether the WSOAA's
enlargement of allowable damages frustrates the federal purposes of
mineral development or infringes on the federal authority limit
damages.
115. See Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 580; see also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,
543 (1976).
116. 43 U.S.C. § 299(a) (2006); 30 U.S.C. § 54 (2006).
117. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402(c)(i), (ii).
118. Id. § 30-5-405(a)(i). The amount and method of compensation can be determined
in any manner mutually agreeable to both estates, and consideration should be given to
the amount of time during which the loss occurs. Id. § 30-5-405(a)(ii).
119. See infra Part IV.C.
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2. Frustration of Federal Purposes
The purpose of the MLA is to promote the orderly development
of oil and gas deposits in public lands; 120 however, FLPMA and the
EPACT encompass additional and more recent federal
considerations of surface uses and the environmental impacts of
mining. When looking to all congressional intentions, the overall
federal purpose is to allow access to federal minerals in a manner that
permits both parties to use their property to the highest degree
possible, in a manner not inconsistent with the rights of the other.12 1
Allowing the surface owner to stop access to minerals or to
unilaterally put conditions in place would clearly frustrate federal
objectives because it dictates the federal government's access to its
own property. Such a situation would also be contrary to Congress'
power to "make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting . .. Property belonging to the United States." 2   But, if
mineral development is incompatible with the rights of the surface
owner, since the surface owner cannot stop or condition
development, he should at least be compensated for damages that
affect the surface estate's value and future use.
The WSOAA damage provision does this by giving surface
owners the power to negotiate all damages to their land while also
allowing the development of federal minerals to continue
unobstructed by any unwillingness on the part of the surface owner.123
The WSOAA damages do not give the surface owner or the state the
power to veto Congress' desire to develop federal minerals. If
negotiations between parties are successful and development
proceeds under that alternative, then the WSOAA broadens the
damages that the surface owner can be compensated for. But if the
mineral developer objects and does not wish to pay these additional
damages, so long as negotiations have been attempted in good faith,
extraction is still able to proceed through the posting of a bond. 24
120. Harvey v. Udall, 384 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1967); see also Geosearch, Inc. v.
Andrus, 508 F. Supp. 839, 842 (D. Wyo. 1981).
121. See Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976); see also
Mergen, supra note 17, at 435-36.
122. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
123. This is in line with Gulf Oil's rule that states cannot prohibit federally approved
uses either temporarily or permanently in an attempt to substitute state judgment for that
of the federal government. Ventura Cnty. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir.
1979).
124. See infra Part IV.C.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
3. Intrusion into Federal Authority
Turning to whether this WSOAA damage provision intrudes into
the sphere of federal authority to limit compensation, Congress has
general power over mineral leasing, but has left space for states to
add rules and regulations.12' This indicates that Congress did not
intend federal regulations in this field to be an upper limit, but rather
that states be able to supplement so long as state regulations do not
conflict with federal laws. 126 The WSOAA regulations are similar to
those in California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock in that they
"seek[] to regulate a given mining use so that it is carried out in a
more environmentally sensitive and resource-protective fashion."127
But, unlike the preempted Granite Rock regulations that required
state approval of development plans and adherence to certain state
requirements before proceeding, the WSOAA does not stop
developers from extracting minerals nor does it prohibit damage to
the surface. Developers are free to proceed, but they will need to pay
for any resulting damages that affect the surface estate's production
and income value, land value, or value of improvements. The
WSOAA damage provisions do not intrude into the sphere of federal
authority or frustrate federal purposes; therefore this provision is not
operationally preempted.
The WSOAA supplements the minimums provided for by
Congress in a way that does not intrude on federal authority because
it allows development to proceed and federal purposes to be fulfilled.
Not only do the WSOAA damage provisions maintain the
development of federal minerals, the purpose of the broader damages
is to advance the "public health, safety, peace, and welfare," of the
surface owner." Collectively, since almost half of all privately owned
land in Wyoming is located on top of federal minerals, these
regulations do not only benefit individual surface owners-they
protect huge swaths of land across Wyoming. The damage provision
therefore also falls under the plenary authority of Wyoming's police
power.12 The proper exercise of this power is not unlimited as it is
125. See Gulf Oil, 601 F.2d at 1086; see also Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 277 F. Supp. 366, 371 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
126. Gulf Oil, 601 F.2d at 1086.
127. Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587 (1987).
128. See Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern
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subject to the supervision of the courts, but the Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. test will only find exercises of police power
unconstitutional if it is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.""o
Mineral developers could attempt to argue that the additional
WSOAA damages are arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore
constitute a taking, but this claim would fail."' The Murphy v. Amoco
court held that requiring the mineral developer to compensate the
surface owner for damages does not take private property for public
112use without just compensation. This is because even amidst broader
damage requirements, the mineral owner still has the same property
rights as before and remains free to develop the minerals as
previously planned-paying damages does not defeat the ability of
the developer to realize the value of the mineral estate.'33 Even if the
right to damage the surface estate were characterized as part of the
'property right' of the mineral estate, restrictions on that right would
not amount to a compensable taking because it affects just one strand
in the bundle." Since the WSOAA would be examined in its
entirety, state modification of this one strand would not amount to an
uncompensated taking."'
130. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); see also Murphy v.
Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1984).
131. Alternatively, discussing substantive due process allegations in this type of case,
the Court in Lingle v. Chevron held that whether a regulation substantially advances a
legitimate governmental goal is not an appropriate method for identifying violations of
substantive due process because the inquiry looks only to due process concerns and does
not discern whether private property has been taken for the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005).
132. Murphy, 729 F.2d at 558.
133. Id. The WSOAA and its effects are distinguishable from Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon because in that case part of the mineral developer's property right was
permanently transferred by statute to the surface owner without just compensation and
against a valid contract that defined the property rights otherwise. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922). Whereas here, the mineral developer still retains the same property
rights of entry and extraction. The WSOAA does not permanently transfer a right to the
surface owner to be compensated for certain damages, it just opens up the field of
negotiations.
134. See Murphy, 729 F.2d at 558.
135. See id.
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C. Entry Through Bond Procedures
The "bond-on" process is available under the SRHA and federal
regulations as an alternative route to begin development if other
options fail.'36 In practice, the "bonding-on" option is not frequently
used because mineral lessees often give consent or enter into
voluntary surface damage agreements."' To acquire entry to the
surface, the mineral developer must post a "3814" bond for the use
and benefit of the surface owner for damages "to the crops or
tangible improvements.""' The bond must not be less than $1,000.00
and BLM has the authority to require additional bonding if
necessary."' In addition, before operations commence, a second
"3104" reclamation bond is necessary.'" This bond shall not be less
than the minimum amount required to ensure "complete and timely
plugging of the well(s), reclamation of the lease area(s), and the
restoration of any lands or surface waters adversely affected by lease
operations."14' Even if the surface owner still objects, so long as the
procedural requirements are in order, BLM may approve the bonds
and permit development.142
Under the WSOAA, if good faith negotiations stall, operations
may similarly go forward upon the execution of good and sufficient
bond.143 As with the WSOAA damages compensable under the
surface use agreement, the WSOAA bond covers damages broader
than those provided for in the SRHA: "loss of production and
income, loss of land value and loss of value of improvements caused
by oil and gas operations."'" The bond for entry shall not be less than
$2,000.00 per well site on the land.145 A reclamation bond is also
required to secure the "performance of the duty to plug each dry or
136. 43 U.S.C. § 299(a) (2006); 43 C.F.R. § 3814.1(c) (2009); see also Drake D. Hill &
P. Jaye Rippley, The Split Estate: Communication and Education Versus Legislation, 4
WYo. L. REV. 585, 599 (2004).
137. Hill & Rippley, supra note 136, at 599.
138. 43 C.F.R. § 3814.1(c).
139. Id.; see also Hill & Rippley, supra note 136, at 600.
140. 43 C.F.R § 3104.1(a) (2009).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 3814.1(d); see also Hill & Rippley, supra note 136, at 600.
143. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402(c)(iv) (2009).
144. Id. § 30-5-405(a)(i).
145. Id. § 30-5-404(b).
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abandoned well or the repair of wells causing waste and compliance
with the rules and orders of the commission."'46
1. Compliance with Both as a Physical Impossibility
The existence of state bonding requirements does not make it
impossible to also satisfy federal bond obligations-a larger sum will
just need to be provided by the developer to satisfy both bonds. The
complication is that a situation could arise wherein an operator has
paid the federal entry bond, but is denied entry until the state bond
has been paid. This would create an impermissible temporary state
veto.'47 But, it is enough to defeat a facial challenge to the WSOAA if
a set of circumstances exists where the state requirements can be
applied without preemption.'" Such a situation is possible if the state
bonds are secured prior to the completed approval of the posted
federal bonds.'49 In that case, state bond requirements would not
block federally authorized entry or extraction as development could
commence as soon as federal bonding requirements were fulfilled.
2. Frustration of Federal Purposes
Federal bonding regulations may be extensive, but like the MLA
they do not contain the congressional intent to assert exclusive
control.so Federal regulations call for bonds to cover damages to
crops and other improvements, and say that BLM has authority to
require additional bonding if necessary."' Without the intent to assert
exclusive control, the federal bonding amounts are more
appropriately viewed as a regulatory floor for states to supplement
than as a ceiling. BLM's authority to increase bond amounts also
indicates that federal requirements are not a maximum. In addition,
recent congressional calls that mineral development "address[]
surface owner concerns and minimiz[e] impacts to private
146. Id. § 30-5-104(d)(i)(D).
147. See Ventura Cnty. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 1979).
148. See Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 589 (1987); see also
John D. Leshy, Granite Rock and the States' Influence over Federal Land Use, 18 ENVTL.
L. 99, 100 (1987).
149. Such a permissible application would not exist if the WSOAA, for instance,
required entry or drilling to begin within ten days after bonds were posted. But the
WSOAA does not have any requirements that would have such an effect.
150. See, e.g., Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 406 F.2d 1303, 1304-06
(10th Cir. 1969); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. BDS Int'l, LLC, 159 P.3d 773, 785 (Colo. App.
2006) (discussing Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 572).
151. 43 C.F.R. § 3814.1(c) (2009); see also Hill & Rippley, supra note 136, at 599.
surface[s]"'52 illustrates a federal concern with surface damages
beyond just crops and improvements. The broader WSOAA bonds
do not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal goals,
but rather they exemplify the most recent expressions of federal
purpose-to address surface owner concerns and minimize impacts."
Because state entry and reclamation bonds can be applied without
frustrating federal regulations, preemption of the WSOAA is not
authorized by the Supremacy Clause."
Conclusion
The mineral industry is beginning to lose its once "preeminent
place among federal land uses""' and it is now becoming "one use
among many and deserv[ing] [of] no more deference than any
other."16  Due in part to this shift, and prompted by aggressive
domestic energy policies and advancements in mining techniques,
federal and state legislators have taken appropriate action to protect
the environment and surface owners of lands overlaying federal
minerals.'17 Beginning with early adjustments to federal statutes and
up through recent program audits and recommendations, Congress
has illustrated a consistent intent that surface uses be considered as
federal minerals are developed.
The extraction of oil and gas is essential to Wyoming and the
United States. But, the goal of Congress to facilitate access to
minerals is qualified by the need to address surface owner concerns
and to minimize impacts to the surface estate.'"9 At first glance, this
tension between mineral developers and surface owners is a dispute
over property rights that were plainly apportioned long ago in the
homestead era. But, this ignores the fact that for many surface
owners, the viability of their land depends upon its environmental
152. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1835(a)(3), 119 Stat. 594, 1140
(2005).
153. See infra Part III.C.ii.
154. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
155. Leshy, supra note 148, at 126.
156. Id.
157. Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537, 546 (Wyo. 1988).
158. See, e.g., id. at 546-47.
159. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1835(a)( 3), 119 Stat. 594,
1140 (2005).
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health.'60 Mineral development in the West is essential, but oil and
gas should be developed responsibly, keeping in mind that the
integrity of surface values are as important to the people of the state
as oil and gas are to the nation.1
The WSOAA appropriately considers all of these factors and
encourages mineral development by socially and environmentally.
acceptable means. The WSOAA creates a more sustainable system
that "protect[s] traditional land uses ... ,account[s] for the interest of
future generations, and internalize[s] costs to the producer."' 62 Under
this state law, federal minerals can continue to be developed while
certain mechanisms protect the interests of surface owners. Because
the WSOAA does not make compliance with federal laws impossible
nor does it stand as an obstacle to Congress' objectives, the WSOAA
is not preempted by federal law.
160. Keith G. Bauerle, Reaping the Whirlwind: Federal Oil and Gas Development on
Private Lands in the Rocky Mountain West, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (2006).
161. J. Benjamin Winburn, Comment, The Coalbed Methane Boom: The Push for
Energy Independence Raises Questions About Water and the Rights of America's
Homesteaders, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 359, 381 (2006).
162. James Murphy, Slowing the Onslaught and Forecasting Hope for Change:
Litigation Efforts Concerning the Environmental Impacts of Coalbed Methane
Development in the Powder River Basin, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 399, 436 (2007); see also
Gary Bryner, Coalbed Methane Development in the Intermountain West, Natural RES.
CrR., UNIV. OF COLO. SCH. OF LAW, 36-37 (July 2002), http://www.colorado.edullaw/
centers/nrlc/publications/CBMPrimer.pdf.
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